Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health Policy  by Graham, John D.
Volume 6 • Number 4 • 2003
V A L U E  I N  H E A L T H
© ISPOR 1098-3015/03/$15.00/417 417–419 417
Blackwell Science, LtdOxford, UKVHEValue in Health1098-30152003 ISPORJuly/August 200364417419CommentaryCost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health PolicyGraham
Address correspondence to: John D. Graham, Administrator,
Ofﬁce of Information & Regulatory Affairs, Ofﬁce of Man-
agement and Budget, Executive Ofﬁce of the President, 262
Eisenhower Executive Ofﬁce Building, Washington, DC
20503.
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health Policy
John D. Graham, PhD
Ofﬁce of Information & Regulatory Affairs, Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, Executive Ofﬁce of the President, Washington, DC, USA
As a strong advocate of the formal tools of regula-
tory analysis, such as risk analysis, decision analy-
sis, cost-effectiveness analysis, and cost–beneﬁt
analysis, I believe that these tools can help us
accomplish more public health and medical protec-
tion at less cost than will occur when decisions are
made without good analysis. Although formal anal-
yses do have much insight to offer, it is fair to say
that their inﬂuence on practical decision making in
both the public sector and the private sector has
been limited to date. The following are steps that
groups like ISPOR can take to increase the inﬂuence
of these analytic tools in the policy process. I am
tempted to suggest, after 10 months of experience,
that the real reason lies in the ratio of professional
afﬁliations in the regulatory arms of the govern-
ment, which run about ﬁve lawyers for one analyst,
or at least that is what I have been sensing in my ini-
tial experience in government. But I do think that
there are some deeper intellectual and institutional
reasons why these types of analysis that we cham-
pion have a limited impact, and I suggest a few of
those ideas for your consideration.
First, there is the enormous challenge of assessing
the likelihood and severity of a health threat, par-
ticularly an emerging health threat. Sometimes there
is ample basis for public or clinical concern about a
hazard, but there may be very limited historical
basis for determining the precise magnitude,
whether measured in probability or severity. Exam-
ples that easily come to mind are bioterrorism, mad
cow disease, and antibiotic resistance. To perform
good risk assessments of these threats, we need
much better information about the most susceptible
subgroups in communities in society because expo-
sures to these groups may determine the overall
public health signiﬁcance of an emerging hazard.
A closely related issue is identifying the most
important sources or causes of health problems.
Thinking back from being raised as a young child, I
recall being instructed by my parents of the merits
of margarine relative to butter, and of course now
we are increasingly learning of the heart disease
risks associated with trans-fatty acids often of sig-
niﬁcant concentration in margarine. We need to
have risk assessment information, very precise risk
assessment information on what does 1 g per day of
trans fat mean in your diet, compared to 1 g per day
of saturated fat. We suffer the same needs for risk
assessment information in the environmental health
ﬁeld. In the case of particulate air pollution, we
often make the simple assumption that all ﬁne par-
ticles in the air are equally toxic regardless of their
precise diameter or chemical composition and yet
ﬁne particles from different sources, say motor vehi-
cles and power plants, vary somewhat in their typ-
ical size distribution and their chemical content. As
modelers, we often make the assumption that all
particles are equal because it is analytically tracta-
ble, not because it is biologically plausible. Indeed it
is quite possible that some particles are more toxic
than others, information that could play an impor-
tant role in setting priorities and doing good
analysis.
Which institutions in society should be responsi-
ble for this applied risk assessment research func-
tion? One might think that university-based
scientists could offer analytic solutions to these
challenges and they often do. Yet these emerging
health issues, including the identiﬁcation of sources
and causes, often require collaboration of scientists
for multiple disciplines. and having spent 20 years
in three universities, my experience tells me that it is
often times difﬁcult to get the university community
organized to offer those multidisciplinary teams. It
also entails a willingness to develop and validate
mathematical models that provide speculative yet
useful forecasts about what is possible or probable.
Yet in many universities, this type of modeling exer-
cise is not necessarily the most attractive academic
pathway. I am encouraged that organizations like
the National Science Foundation and the NIH do
make available certain types of grants to support
this applied risk assessment research, and I am
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aware that many of the mission oriented agencies
also do. But I also believe that it is critical for the
public and private sectors to work together to sup-
port ﬁrst-rate peer-reviewed science in these arenas.
While very diverse, organizations such as the Health
Affects Institute, the International Life Sciences
Institute, the Research Triangle Institute, the Chem-
ical Industry Institute of Toxicology, and the Elec-
tric Power Research Institute have one common
feature, which is a commitment to bring public and
private sector people together to work with univer-
sity scientists on these issues. We need to work
harder to strengthen the scientiﬁc quality, credibil-
ity, and policy relevance of these applied research
organizations to inform the public sector and the
private sectors.
Second, going beyond health risk assessment, we
need better tools to compare the health beneﬁts of
policies to their economic costs. You might think of
this ﬁeld as health risk evaluation. By evaluation I
mean the analytic process of scoring or rating
health affects in terms of their overall burden on
the patient and on society and quantifying the ben-
eﬁts of health policies in monetary or other units
that capture the preferences of the public. The cen-
tral intellectual challenge is to account for the
adverse affects of both morbidity and mortality in
some single numerical index, recognizing that some
bouts of sickness are more severe than others, and
some deaths may be considered more tragic than
others.
Although answers to these questions require
value judgments, the social sciences have much to
offer in providing possible answers. In the develop-
ing world, the World Health Organization has
promoted a metric called the disability adjusted life-
year, or the DALY. Diverse health problems ranging
from infectious diseases to trauma are scored in
terms of the number of DALYs that a society loses.
The scoring of each health condition is based on
three factors: the number of life-years lost com-
pared to the Japanese experience, weights applied to
each healthy life-year to reﬂect productivity at work
and at home, and weights for each unhealthy life-
year are applied to capture the degree of functional
limitation imposed on a person. Although my
description of the DALY has been very simplistic,
the tool continues to be reﬁned in various ways and
its use is increasing around the world.
A precursor to the DALY, often favored by my
colleagues at the Harvard School of Public Health,
the quality-adjusted life-year, or QALY, is now the
standard measure of health policy effectiveness used
by many academics. It is similar to the DALY but
differs in three important ways. First, the loss of life
expectancy from each condition is derived either
from actuary or experimental data or from mode-
ling for a relevant target population, rather than
from the Japanese experience. Second, each year of
healthy life is weighted the same, regardless of when
in the life span that loss occurs. This assumption is
defended on grounds of fairness and analytic sim-
plicity, although it is a very different assumption
than that imbedded in DALYs. Finally, the weights
for different health states are typically derived in
surveys of community residents or patients who
have experienced the condition.
Early work on QALYs was very simplistic in its
use of utility theory, clinical understanding, and
insights of survey methods, but I think that it is fair
to say that the sophisticated of QALY-oriented
research is improving. Both the DALY and the
QALY methods, because of their very assumptions,
place more emphasis on health risks affecting mid-
dle-age adults and young people than risks of
chronic diseases of old age. This emphasis is not
necessarily consistent with the current patterns in
the US health-care system, where we invest billions
of dollars late in the life span, and of course there
are economic critics of DALYs and QALYs who
argue that these methods depart from classical eco-
nomic assumptions in ways that current investment
patterns reveal. For example, a standard economic
view is that consumer sovereignty should be
respected. If well-informed senior citizens who
often have substantial assets and previous few
remaining life years have a large demand for modest
health gains, so be it. and there is a growing litera-
ture in economics aimed at quantifying the mone-
tary beneﬁts of reducing different diseases and
health impairments.
Yet, these willingness-to-pay tools face a host of
ethical and technical criticisms. I heard them from
my students at the Harvard School of Public Health,
when we taught these analytic methods. At the most
basic ethical level, concerns have been raised about
whether a person’s income level or asset position
should be permitted to inﬂuence how much a gov-
ernmental study values their health status. Others
have argued that a fair allocation of public
resources throughout the life span should be deter-
mined in a so-called veil of ignorance where peo-
ple’s views are not inﬂuenced by current age or
health status. Yet there are certainly some practical
problems with implementing that idea. At a techni-
cal level, substantial progress has been made in esti-
mating willingness to pay for health protection.
Questions have also been raised about whether
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stated willingness to pay by survey respondents is
adequately sensitive to the amount of risk reduction
and the content of the risk reduction. In light of
these many difﬁculties you may ﬁnd it interesting
that the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (OMB)
does not currently require agencies to value health
gains and losses in monetary units. Some agencies
such as the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration and the National Highway Trafﬁc Safety
Administration have refrained from this practice for
several decades. I believe that we need to have a
greater degree of consensus from within the analytic
community about how we should proceed on these
health risk evaluation questions and I urge that
some form of conference be assembled and gener-
ated, sponsored by several federal agencies, to try to
bring some degree of road map if you will for the
ﬁeld in this area and to lay out some guidelines for
practice. I think this professional society could be a
very important contributor to that activity.
What has happened in OMB in this general area
of analytic practice? We see health policy occurring
at a variety of federal agencies, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), the US Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA), the Center for Medicaid and Medicare
Services (CMS), and Centers for Diseases Control
(CDC), to name just a few. These agencies are now
using a wide range of analytic practices and quite
frankly they are not always mutually consistent.
Rarely are these analytic practices rooted in statute,
which in a sense is good news because it means
there is opportunity without changing underlying
laws, to bring some more reason and consistency to
this process. The OMB does have an important role
to play in fostering some degree of consistency. Yet
agencies sometimes have important reasons for
doing things differently, and the OMB’s challenge is
to appreciate when these distinctions have merit. In
the Bush administration, we support development
of health policies and regulations that are based on
sound science and economics. We are certainly not
allergic to regulation; indeed, we view it as a critical
tool of national health policy, as critical as govern-
ment spending and taxation. My ofﬁce, in particu-
lar, strives to prompt and approve good health
regulations, while improving ﬂawed ones and stop-
ping harmful ones. We see better formal analysis as
a critical step toward more effective, fair, and efﬁ-
cient healthy policies.
In my ﬁrst year at the OMB we have taken two
modest steps to promote more analytic rigor and
consistency in health policy throughout the federal
government. You can learn more about these issues
on the OMB Web site; however, let me conclude by
summarizing them. First, the OMB recently estab-
lished analytic guidelines for health risk assessment
that cover all the federal agencies. The guidelines
based on two rounds of public comment and inter-
agency review is actually rooted in principles found
in the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of
1996, and although that might seem very speciﬁc, if
you consult those amendments, you will ﬁnd that
there is a wide degree of general applicability to
those principles. When these guidelines took affect
in October 2002, the public will have been provided
an opportunity to challenge any health risk infor-
mation, disseminated by a federal agency that does
not adhere to these guidelines. Second of all, in col-
laboration with the Council of Economic Advisors,
the OMB has initiated a process to reﬁne the guid-
ance we provide to agencies on how to do good reg-
ulatory analysis, economic impact analysis, decision
analysis, and so forth.
In the ﬁrst phase we asked for public comment by
the end of May 2002 on speciﬁc analytic issues
including health risk evaluation that should be
addressed in OMB’s reﬁnement of its existing guid-
ance. and we would look forward to comments
from any of you on that process. By the end of May
2002 you can comment through the Internet. We
will prepare a proposed revision of the OMB’s ana-
lytic guidance and we will release it for public com-
ment, interagency review, and external peer review.
My ofﬁce will use the OMB guidance to judge
whether the regulatory analysis prepared by agen-
cies are adequate.
Looking forward, to enhance the roles of science
and economics and health policy, we must do some-
thing that is as obvious as it is critical: improve both
the technical and the ethical foundations of the
tools we use to inform policy makers. Organiza-
tions like this one have a critical role to play in that
process and we at the OMB look forward to work-
ing with you.
This presentation was given May 21, 2002, at the ISPOR
7th Annual International Meeting during the Second Ple-
nary Session, “The Rise of Risk Management” held in
Arlington, VA, USA.
